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A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY REMEDIES
FOR THE WRONGLY CONVICTED: WHAT WORKS,
WHAT DOESN’T AND WHY
ADELE BERNHARD1

INTRODUCTION
Since the first wrongful conviction was overturned by DNA evidence, more
than 230 wrongly convicted individuals have been exonerated. For most, the
long awaited and hard won exoneration is the beginning of a new struggle.
Exonerees face insuperable hurdles upon release. Lacking recent employment
history or experience, work is difficult to secure. Without education or funds,
most can’t access necessary counseling or relevant training. Often without
family, they live alone and lonely.2 Money alone can never repair damage
done by an undeserved prison sentence or fully compensate for pain and suffering. A monetary award, however, does provide a springboard from which to
begin life again.
Compensation statutes are necessary because individuals convicted and incarcerated for crimes they did not commit are generally precluded from recovering damages by the inflexibility of tort law and civil rights doctrine, despite
later exoneration.3 It’s surprisingly difficult for exonerees to win civil lawsuits.
Doctrines of immunity protect police and prosecutors. Malpractice claims
against inadequate defense counsel are virtually impossible to mount. Sometimes there is simply no one to blame: witnesses make mistakes, defense counsel act reasonably, and the prosecution has probable cause.4 And even if a
lawsuit is feasible, civil litigation is expensive, time consuming, and uncertain.
Ultimately, although a few exonerees have won large awards, most have not.5
In response to the failure of the tort and civil rights laws to provide a consistent remedy for exonerees, and in light of the obvious fact that the criminal
justice system can never be completely error-proof, some states have enacted
1

Associate Professor of Law, Pace Law School. B.A. and J.D. New York University.
VOLLENS, LOLA & EGGERS, DAVID, SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 432-33 (2005).
3 See generally, Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 86-92 (1999) (hereinafter When Justice Fails.)
4 See also Bernhard, supra note 3 at 86-92 (1999) (discussing legal barriers to recovery).
5 For a complete listing of DNA exonerations, see The Innocence Project—Know the
Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited March 21, 2009). The website
includes an interactive map of the United States, which provides details of exonerees by state
and whether the exonerees received compensation.
2
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statutes to compensate exonerees.6 Ideally, compensation statutes should provide generous, rapid, and certain damage awards, accompanied by education
and social services, for all those who have been wrongly convicted and later
exonerated. This Article will address the need for such statutes and examine
some of the differences among them.
I. DAVID SHEPHARD: A PRIME EXAMPLE
David Shephard’s story is a prime example of why we need compensation
statutes.7 David was wrongly convicted of rape based on one mistaken eyewitness identification. After his release from prison, he found it almost impossible
to win an award of damages to help him begin life again.
In 1982, David Shephard was nineteen. He worked at Newark Airport in
New Jersey.8 David was a member of the airport ground crew who directed
jets to the gates.9 David was making a good salary for a young man who had
yet to graduate high school.10 He was involved in a serious relationship with a
young woman, and the two were expecting their first child.11 His life changed
on New Year’s Eve 1983, however, when he was arrested for a crime that he
did not commit.12
A. The Crime
A week earlier, on Christmas Eve, a white woman was shopping at the
Woodridge Mall in New Jersey when she was abducted by two men.13 The men
forced her to accompany them to a neighboring town where they took turns
having sex with her in her own car.14 Afterwards, the victim reported the crime
to the police. Unable to provide a detailed description of the perpetrators,15 she
6

For a complete list of the state statutes, see the attached chart.
David Shephard’s story is one of twenty-six collected in EDWARD CONNERS ET AL.,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, 70-71 (U.S. Department of Justice, National
Institute of Justice) (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf. After I
read about his story, I called his attorney Paul Casteleiro to learn about the details of his fight
for compensation. David Shephard’s story has since been recounted in BARRY SCHECK ET
AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED 223-33 (2000). See also Bernhard, supra note 3 at 110-11.
8 Scheck, supra note 7 at 225.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id,
15 David Shephard is African American, and the victim is white. Cross-racial misidentifications are common. See generally, Sheri Lynn Johnson, CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION ERRORS IN CRIMINAL CASES, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984).
7
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remembered that one of the attackers referred to the other as “Dave.”16 A week
later, police recovered the victim’s car near a terminal building at Newark Airport. They found her purse in a trash bin close to where the car was abandoned.17 The police investigation subsequently focused on people connected to
the airport. The police called the administrator in charge of the ground crew
who arranged to exhibit the crew to the victim, identifying those staff members
whose names were Dave.18
B. The Identification
When David Shephard picked up his paycheck on New Year’s Eve, the victim was watching as he and his fellow employees were paraded single file
through a specially assembled tent in the hangar.19 There were two employees
named Dave. Supervisors pointed them out. Not surprisingly, the victim subsequently identified David Shephard as one of the two men who had raped her.
Today it might be possible to argue that the parade was so suggestive as to
violate due process.20 Social scientists are now studying the malleability of
memory and the process by which identifications are made, and they have
made inexpensive practical suggestions to decrease the likelihood of mistaken
identification.21 Police forces are slowly adopting some of those suggestions
and incorporating them into practice.22 As a result of the social science revelations, courts are beginning to look more critically at cases where the only proof
16

Scheck, supra note 7 at 225-27.
Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 The substantive test for determining whether a due process violation occurred at the
lineup is whether, considering the totality of circumstances, the pretrial identification was so
unnecessarily suggestive that it created a substantial likelihood of mistaken identification.
Neil v. Biggers 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
21 See Gary L. Wells et al., Recommendations for Properly Conducted Lineup Identification Tasks, in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 223,
229 (David Frank Ross et al. eds., 1994); Avaraham M. Levi, Are Defendants Guilty If They
Were Chosen in a Lineup? 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 389 (1998); Gary L. Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 603-13 (1998); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness
Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 765, 779 (1995).
22 For example, the Wisconsin Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General has
adopted a “Best Practices for Eyewitness Identification”; the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General has created mandatory guidelines for the police in preparing and conducting
photo and live lineup identification procedures: and the Northampton Massachusetts Police
Department’s Administration and Operations Manual contains guidelines for Eyewitness
Identification. All these examples can be found by checking the Eyewitness Identification
section of the Innocence Project Website at www.innocenceproject.org.
17
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is the testimony of a single eyewitness,23 and, as a result, the concept of due
process as applied to identification procedures is becoming more expansive.
However, when David Shephard was arrested, that line-up parade at Newark
was unquestionably legal,24 and eyewitness testimony was generally viewed as
reliable and trustworthy. Based on the victim’s identification, David was arrested, indicted, and brought to trial.
C. The Trial
At trial, the victim testified that she was certain David Shephard had raped
her. David Shephard asserted his innocence,25 and testified that he had been at
work on the evening of the rape. Family members told the jury that he had left
the house and returned as usual.26 David even found and convinced the bus
driver who normally took him to work to testify. Unfortunately for David, his
witnesses were not as convincing in their testimony as the victim was in hers.
Perhaps because the crime occurred on Christmas Eve, no one could remember
specific details regarding David’s whereabouts on that day.27 Their testimony
sounded generic. The driver, for example, could only say that David was a
regular passenger.28 He couldn’t say for sure that David was on the bus on
Christmas Eve.29 Presented with two opposing narratives, the jury discredited
the alibi witnesses and convicted David Shephard.30
D. The Exoneration
David Shephard served eleven years and four months in the state penitentiary
before analysis of the semen preserved in the rape kit (but not subjected to
DNA analysis at the time of the crime and investigation) proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not the rapist, leading to his release.31
When David Shephard finally walked out of prison, he reconnected with the
23 People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007) (holding that it was error for trial court to
deny defense request to call an expert to testify about the causes of mistaken identification.)
24 One reason for fashioning an exclusionary rule that would disallow testimony resulting
from an improper identification procedure is to deter law enforcement authorities from exhibiting an accused to witnesses in a suggestive manner. 2 IMWINKELRIED, EDWARD J. ET AL,
COURT ROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, § 2805 (3d ed.); citing United State v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.263 (1967). It could be argued here that there
was no police involvement in the procedure. It could also be argued that the identification
parade was even less suggestive than a line-up as so many fillers were used.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Conners, supra note 7 at 71; Scheck, supra note 7 at 227.
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woman he had been dating.32 By then, his son had grown into a teenager.
Shephard found a job in janitorial services, but making less than he had as a
young man at Newark Airport.33 In addition to the humiliation caused by settling for low wage work, David was shocked to discover, when he picked up
his first paycheck, that his wages were being garnished by the state for failure
to pay child support.34 Although he had been serving a prison term that deprived him of the right to raise his child, he was nevertheless obligated to reimburse the state for welfare benefits extended to the mother of his child.35 David
needed money and vindication.
E. Search for Damages
Upon leaving prison, David needed an income. He contemplated filing a
lawsuit, surmising that a person who had served almost twelve years in prison
for a crime he did not commit would be entitled to some kind of compensation.
David took his transcript, police reports and DNA test results, and looked for a
civil rights lawyer.36 He met Paul Casteleiro, a New Jersey lawyer specializing
in civil rights and criminal defense work. Mr. Casteleiro read through all the
material, but informed David that he could not fashion a cause of action. Paul
explained that, “There was no one to sue.”37 Once the victim had made the
identification, the police had probable cause to arrest.38 As a matter of fact, it
was their responsibility to arrest David. And, because the prosecutors had no
reason to doubt the victim’s identification or her credibility, they believed it
was their responsibility to prosecute the case.39 Although the victim thought
was certain about her identification, she was wrong. Defense Counsel may not
have tried a perfect case, but her assistance was not ineffective, nor did it
amount to legal malpractice. In the end, it was clear that neither the police, nor
the prosecutors, defense counsel, nor the victim could be sued. Simply put, not
every mistake can be remedied through a lawsuit.
II. PRIVATE BILLS
Upon realizing that David did not have a legal cause of action, Paul Castelerio explored other possible avenues of compensation. He discovered that many
states permit legislators to enact legislation with the sole and exclusive function
32

Scheck, supra note 7 at 228.
LOLA VOLLENS & DAVID EGGERS, SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 432-33 (2005).
34 Scheck, supra note 7 at 228.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Bernhard, supra note 3 at 86-89.
39 Id. at 89-90
33
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of making a monetary award (using the state’s money) to an exoneree.40 The
“private bill” mechanism (as this special legislation is often described) may
sound anachronistic, but it is still used across the country in those unusual situations when a state incurs a legitimate debt and has no other means of repaying
that debt.41
Other exonerees have won damages awards through private bills; one such
example is Edward Honaker, who received a half a million dollars from the
state of Virginia in 1996.42 The Alabama legislature granted Freddie Lee
Gaines a million dollars to compensate him for the years he spent in prison
wrongly convicted.43 In 2005, the state legislature of Georgia awarded Clarence Harrison a million dollars.44
The private bill is not a perfect solution because it’s an award granted
through the political system, not a right recognized by the legal process.45 Enacting a law is a cumbersome, multistep, slow process. Exonerees must find a
legislator willing to introduce the bill. The legislator must then garner support
in both houses so that the bill will pass when it comes up for a vote. This can be
a long and arduous process depending upon what else is being debated and the
fiscal health of the state. In Florida, for example, it took Freddie Lee Pitts and
Wilbert Lee 20 years to muster sufficient support to convince the state legislature to enact a bill providing them with compensation.46
Moreover, because there is no fact-finding mechanism in the political process, there is no way to know, when the private bill is introduced, whether the
person on whose behalf the bill has been introduced is really innocent. This
concern is generally illusory when an exoneration is based on DNA evidence
(because DNA proof of innocence is completely certain), but not every reversal
of a conviction is predicated on DNA evidence or even on new evidence at all.
Sometimes convictions are reversed for reasons not synonymous with innocence, and sometimes those cases are not re-tried or re-prosecuted. In those –
40

Id. at 93-97.
Michelle Tsai, 18 Years in Prison? Priceless: How do they figure the payouts for people who were wrongly convicted? www.slate.com/id2166483/ first published May 18, 2007,
(noting twenty-nine states without compensation statutes in which exonerees must lobby for
a private bill to recover losses). The Private Bill can be used in other situations besides to
assist exonerees, but it has been instrumental in obtaining damages awards for exonerees.
42 Act of Apr. 6, 1996, 1996 Va. Acts 754. See Bernhard, supra note 3 at 94-95 (discussing the Honaker case in further detail). Edward Honaker served ten years convicted of rape
before being exonerated with DNA evidence. The evidence against him consisted only of the
victim’s identification. Since 1995, Virginia has compensated seven people through Private
Bills.
43 Act of May 20, 1996, 1996 Ala. Acts 579.
44 Act of May 10, 2005, 2005 Ga. Laws 374.
45 Bernhard, supra note 3 at 93-97.
46 Maurice Rosen Act, 1998 Fl. Laws 431 See Bernhard, supra note 3 at 95 (discussing
the Pitts and Lee cases in further detail).
41
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probably few – situations, individuals may falsely claim to have been innocent.
Arguments and speeches on the floor of the legislature can be misleading, and
without a judicial fact-finding procedure legislatures may be deceived into
making an undeserving award. On the other hand, and probably more frequently, truly innocent and deserving claimants may fail to engender the requisite
support. Innocence and exoneration do not always guarantee political support.
In David Shephard’s case, the private bill route was not an option at all because
the New Jersey constitution forbids the use of a private bill.47
III. COMPENSATION STATUTES
If neither a civil rights claim nor a tort claim will lie, and a private bill option
is either too uncertain or unavailable, the only other possible recourse is a statute enacted specifically to compensate exonerees.48 Twenty-five states, the
District of Columbia, and the federal system have enacted special statutes to
provide indemnification for the wrongly convicted.49 These statutes do not require claimants to discover why the prosecution was erroneous, or who made
mistakes which “caused” the investigation to go awry, or even what those mistakes might have been.50 Compensation statutes provide money and services to
exonerated individuals without regard to fault or blame. Generally, claimants
need only establish innocence and prove that they served time in prison as a
result of the wrongful conviction.
The drive to enact compensation statues began in 1932 when Edwin
Borchard published Convicting the Innocent, a collection of sixty-five stories of
people Borchard believed were completely innocent.51 Appealing to our national pride, he pointed out that many South American and European countries
had already enacted similar legislation.52 In the United States, the first state
statute was enacted in 1913, and several have been enacted within the last five
years.53 All the statutes are different, and while some work well, others do
47 “The Legislature shall not pass any private, special or local laws.” N.J. CONST. art. IV,
§ 7, para. 9; Bernhard, supra note 3 at 110.
48 Bernhard, supra note 3 at 73-74.
49 See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted Fact Sheet, http://innocenceproject.org/
Content/309.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); The Innocence Project, http://www.innocence
project.org/news/LawView1.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (detailing state compensation
laws as selected from an interactive map).
50 Compensation statutes serve a purpose different from civil rights litigation. While a
successful civil rights lawsuit will change behavior – in addition to winning an award for the
injured party – by establishing who was at fault and what those individuals or organizations
did that violated the law, compensation statutes serve a narrower purpose. They simply indemnify exonerees for their loss, pain and suffering.
51 EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932).
52 Id. at 375-406
53 See attached chart
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not.54
Compensation statutes operate similarly to workers’ compensation systems.
Workers’ compensation systems were created during the Industrial Revolution
as society recognized that workers would inevitably be hurt on the job. The
workers’ compensation system pays injured workers regardless of fault. It
doesn’t matter whether the machine malfunctioned or whether the worker fell
asleep on the job. So long as the injury happened on the job, damages are
awarded according to the severity of the injury and the time lost. Likewise, in a
criminal justice system as large as ours, where multiple discretionary decisions
are made every single day, a certain number of people will be wrongly convicted. Compensation statutes measure an exoneree’s loss separate and apart from
how that loss occurred. Ideally, the statutes should be easy to access, generous
and provide awards quickly. Unfortunately they do not all work perfectly.
Many compensation statutes provide only limited awards.55 For example,
Louisiana recently enacted a statute that only provides $15,000 per year of
incarceration with a maximum payout of $150,000.56 Additionally, the statute
requires claimants to waive their right to sue the state in order to collect the
small recovery.57 Apparently the statute was designed primarily to indemnify
the state from its own wrongdoing and only secondarily to assist the wrongly
convicted.
At the other end of the spectrum are state statutes with no limitation on
awards, and which provide social services to assist in the transition from prison
to civilian life. In New York, for example, claims are determined by a Court of
Claims judge who assesses damages in the same way damages are assessed for
any tort claim.58 Judges render careful decisions, paying close attention to
claimants’ experiences in prison and lost opportunities. The average payout in
New York has been around $150,000 per year of wrongful incarceration.59
Modern statutes provide access to social services, such as counseling and education, recognizing the difficulty that claimants have adjusting to life outside
prison walls after many years of institutionalization.60
IV. REQUIREMENTS

AND

DISQUALIFIERS

Some statutes discourage claims because they require claimants to have been
54

See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted Fact Sheet, supra note 49.
Bernhard, supra note 3 at 105-08.
56 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2009); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 87 (2008).
57 Id.
58 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney Supp. 2008), available at http://www.nyscourtof
claims.state.ny.us/claimsact.shtml.
59 See MacLaw: The New York Court of Claims Decisions Database, http://vertumnus.
courts.state.ny.us/claims/maclaw.html (last visited March 22, 2009), for a listing of opinions
and damage awards pursuant to N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b.
60 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 258D § 5 (West 2008).
55
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pardoned in order to recover.61 The pardon requirement throws the process
back into the political maelstrom. Claimants’ potential recovery depends on
the political will of the executive and the wealth of the state coffers. Other
statutes incorporate disqualifiers: some disqualify those with prior felony convictions,62 while others prohibit a person who pled guilty from recovering—
even though several of the first 200 DNA exonerees pled guilty.63 For example, in California, Christopher Ochoa was charged with a car jacking robbery
and threatened with a sentence of twenty-five years to life.64 Out of fear, he
accepted a plea to a two year sentence. When the stolen car was found, the
perpetrator’s sweater and cap – identified by the victim – were in the car.
When the material was subjected to DNA testing, the real profile of the perpetrator emerged, and he was subsequently arrested.65 Mr. Ochoa was released.
It is unfair to disqualify those claimants who were truly innocent but may have
pled guilty on counsel’s advice, or because they were understandably afraid to
go to trial.66
Another common disqualifier is the prohibition against recovery for those
who have done something that “contributed to the conviction.”67 That language
has been interpreted by courts to mean confessing to the crime or making an
admission even when that confession or admission was elicited through extreme psychological pressure—so long as the pressure did not amount to physical abuse. In other words, if a claimant confessed to the police, even after
many hours of interrogation, or even after having been subjected to trickery, in
some states that claimant may be precluded from recovering damages because
the confession will be construed to mean that the exoneree contributed to his
own conviction.68
Many innocent people have falsely confessed. In Pennsylvania, Bruce Godschalk was charged with two rapes that he did not commit.69 The circumstances of the crimes were similar, and the police surmised that the same person
61

See Attached Chart
See, e.g., Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act, 2008 FLA. Laws 39,
§ 4 (precluding recovery for those who have ever been convicted of a felony).
63 Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
304.php (last visited March 30, 2009).
64 The Innocence Project: Christopher Ochoa Case, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/230.php (last April 21, 2009).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Bernhard, supra note 3 at 108-09. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-241 to 2-245 (2009); N.Y.
CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney Supp. 2008).
68 See Attached Chart
69 Godschalk v. Mountgomery County Dist. Attorney’s Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (detailing Mr. Godschalk’s battle to obtain DNA testing); The Innocence
Project: Bruce Godschalk Case, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/154.php (last visited March 22, 2009) (detailing Mr. Godschalk’s exoneration).
62
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committed both rapes. The rape kits in both cases tested positive for semen.
Bruce was arrested, interrogated, and eventually confessed. The confession
was believed to be reliable because it included details that the police said only
the police and the perpetrator would have known. For example, the confession
included the detail that one of the victims was menstruating. At trial one victim
identified Bruce and the other could not. He was convicted of both.
Six years later, Bruce obtained DNA testing which the government fought,
arguing that because of his confession the test results wouldn’t exculpate him.70
The DNA from both rape kits matched, and the test showed that there was just
one perpetrator and that person was not Bruce Godschalk. Bruce was released
after fifteen years in prison. His exoneration shows that the police suggested
facts to Bruce which were then included in the “confession.” Either intentionally or negligently, the police assisted him to incorporate unique facts into his
confession to add verisimilitude, and then misled the prosecuting district attorney by failing to inform him that they had transmitted those facts. His confession was false even though it was convincing.
Researchers have categorized three kinds of false confessions:71 voluntary
false confessions, of which the Jon-Benet Ramsey case is an example,72 coerced-compliant false confessions, in which the target confesses in order to
escape interrogation or gain a promised reward but doesn’t believe what he
says,73 and finally, coerced internalized false confessions, where in the end, the
target believes the confession. An example of an internalized confession might
be the Martin Tankleff case in Long Island, New York.74
Police receive special training in interrogation techniques that are “designed
to break suspects down, [and] convince them that they are doomed, so that they
70

Godschalk, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 367-68.
Saul Kassin has written extensively on the subject of false confessions. See Saul M.
Kassin, On the Psychology of False Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk, 60
AM. PSCYHOL. 215, 221 (2005). See also Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confession and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33
FORDHAM, URB. L.J. 791, 808 (2006). In the paragraphs that follow, I present a quick and
simplistic overview of their work.
72 “On August 16, 2006, 41-year-old John Mark Karr, a former schoolteacher, confessed
to killing Ms. Ramsey” after correspondence with “a journalism professor at the University
of Colorado. Once apprehended, he confessed to being with JonBenét when she died, stating
that her death was an accident.” In the end, however, no charges were brought against Karr
as his DNA did not match that found on JonBenét Ramsey’s body” and his unprompted
confession was disbelieved. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JonBen%C3%A9t_Ramsey#cite_
note-8
73 Godschalk, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 367-68.
74 Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confession and the Case for Reconsidering
the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM, URB. L.J. 791, 792-3
(2006) (Police convinced Martin Tankleff, who had been asleep at home during his parents’
murder, that perhaps he had blacked out and killed his parents).
71
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soon believe that making a confession . . . [is the only] rational or risk reducing
choice.”75 Interrogators generally begin the interrogation process in the same
way. At the start they are non-accusatory but rather friendly, and ask simple
biographical questions to put the target at ease. During this time the police try
to “sense” whether the target is lying, although most scientific experiments
show that no one can figure out who is lying and who is telling the truth.76
During this period, the target believes that the situation is going to be okay.
He’s going to go home. He’ll convince the police that he’s innocent. 77
If the interrogator starts to believe the suspect is lying, the interrogator
moves to an aggressive and confrontational style, deliberately increasing the
tension.78 The suspect then begins to feel desperate, and his or her emotions
change from feeling in control to out-of-control. Police understand that increased emotionality interferes with rational thinking.79 After increasing the
tension and emotionality, interrogators may begin to dominate the interview,
with the goal of convincing the target to incriminate him or herself. Sometimes
the police use a technique called maximization, which is an elaborate process
designed to break down the suspect and convince him that the situation is hopeless and that he will inevitably be convicted.80 To do this, police often relate
the evidence that they believe leads to the suspect.81
Sometimes the police exaggerate or even manufacture evidence to increase
the sense of hopelessness.82 They may, for example, pretend to have DNA results when they do not, or pretend that colleagues lifted the suspect’s finger75 Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 334 (“Most police in the United States are trained
in what is known as the “Reid Technique” of interrogation. The most influential of the
police training manuals that teach this method is Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Janyne’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions . . . .”). See FRED INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 209-374 (2001).
76 Id. at 336 (“In clinical studies, people consistently perform at only slightly better than
chance levels [with typical accuracy rates of about 45 to 60 percent, when chance is 50
percent] at distinguishing lies from truth”); citing Samantha Mann, Aldert Vrij and Ray Bull,
Detecting True Lies, Police Officers’ Ability to Detect Suspects’ Lies, 89 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2004).
77 See generally, Richard A. Leo, False Confession: Causes , Consequences, and Solutions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED : PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE, (Saundra D. Westervelt
and John A Humphrey, Eds)(herein after False Confession)
78 Id. at 334.
79 If you want to learn more about interrogation techniques and how they impact the
targets of police investigation, see Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of False Confessions:
Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 215, 219-221 (2005).
80 Richard A. Leo, False Confession, supra note 77 at 40 – 41.
81 Id.
82 Findley at 335; citing Saul Kassin, Christing C. Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27
LAW& HUM . BEHAV. 187, 188 (2003).
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prints from the crime scene or that the suspect failed a lie detector test, when
none of that is true.83 Once the appropriate state of hopelessness has been
achieved, the police begin to suggest resolution through a technique called minimization.84 Police interrogators may suggest that they know the suspect
wasn’t the mastermind, or that they know he didn’t mean to kill, but only to
rape, and that if he confesses to the rape they’ll intercede with the prosecution
for leniency.85
Although deception isn’t per se prohibited under current case law, some
forms of deception are certainly proscribed.86 For example, when police
fabricated an audio tape so that it sounded as though a fictitious eyewitness had
already identified the target of the interrogation as the perpetrator (hoping to
fool the target into thinking there was a witness against him), a New Jersey trial
court held that the resulting confession was voluntary and admissible.87 On
appeal, the court traced the history of police interrogation practices from the
use of physical force to the modern day use of psychologically coercive techniques and condemned the use of police-fabricated tangible evidence.88 Hopefully, that ruling will be noticed, followed and expanded as a result of what we
learn about confessions and the dangers of police deception and trickery. The
new research seems to show that psychological coercion is just as real and
powerful as physical coercion, and as a result, confessions resulting from such
interrogations should not be considered voluntary,89 and no false confession
83 In State v.Cayward 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 562 So.
2d 347 (Fla. 1990) police fabricated two scientific reports to indicate that semen stains on the
victim’s underwear came from Cayward. The police showed the false reports to Cayward.
He confessed. The Florida court held that the manufacture of false documents by police
officials offends the traditional notions of due process under both the state and federal constitutions. Many courts, however, disagree with the Cayward decision. For example, in
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Kevin Bessey, 112 Nev. 322 (1997), a detective presented a
suspect with a false crime lab report. The inmate then made a number of inculpatory statements. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s suppression of the confession holding
that there was nothing in the treatment of the accused or the setting of the interrogation that
was coercive; there was no reason to believe the accused’s statements were not voluntary;
and there was no evidence the fabricated document did produce or was likely to produce a
false confession.
84 Richard A. Leo, False Confession, supra at note 77: State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 16, 18 (2003).
85 Richard A. Leo, False Confession, supra note 77
86 People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353 (1951) (holding that where the police deprived the
target of food and sleep and brought in a psychiatrist and neurologist who induced the defendant to confess by falsely pretending that he had come to aid him, the deception to render the
resulting confession was inadmissible as involuntarily made.)
87 State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 16, 18 (2003).
88 Id. at 27-28.
89 A statement will be suppressed if a court deems it to have been involuntarily made.
The traditional definition of involuntary is “not the product of a rational intellect or free
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should preclude compensation. Compensation statutes must be drafted or
amended to permit recovery by individuals who falsely confessed in response
to police interrogation techniques.
V. COMPENSATION STATUTES MAKE

A

DIFFERENCE

When Paul Casteleiro realized that he couldn’t bring a lawsuit on David
Shephard’s behalf, he lobbied for a compensation statute in New Jersey.90 First
he involved the press.91 He recruited journalists to write about David’s story.
He then sent the clippings, along with a draft statute, in press packets to every
single state legislator in New Jersey.92 New Jersey State Senators Rice and
Cardinale sponsored the bill,93 and it quickly gained support and passed in the
first legislative session.94 The statute, however, is limited – it awards only
$20,000 a year.95 Nevertheless, that statute gave David Shephard a $220,000
cushion with which to begin life again. David subsequently married the woman he was dating when he was arrested, and they have a second child.
(David’s also been promoted.)
VI. WHAT YOU CAN DO
Across the country, individuals who were wrongly convicted and have since
been exonerated remain un-represented by counsel. Those exonerees could use
help to explore whether they could bring a civil rights lawsuit, or whether they
could access a compensation statute in their state.
If you would like to help, feel free to send me an email
(abernhard@law.pace.edu) and I will introduce you to your local Innocence
Project. If you’re at a law school, this might be a project for a clinical program,
or your clinic may take on the task of designing a compensation statute if you
live in a state that lacks one. If Paul Casteleiro, a single, solo practitioner can
get a statute passed, think of what a well-funded, highly resourced, law school
will.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Although a psychologically coercive situation
can render a statement involuntary, generally courts are reluctant to find statements to have
been involuntarily made unless the statement result from physical abuse. The Tankleff case
is a good example of what kinds of techniques courts will allow. During the course of the
police interrogation of Marty Tankleff whose conviction for murdering his parents has now
been vacated and whose charges dismissed in the interest of justice (199 AD2d 550), police
officers pretended to call the hospital and to speak with Mr. Tankleff’s father who they said
he had awoken from a coma to blame Marty for his murder. The resulting confession was
introduced at the trial and the conviction was upheld. People v. Tankleff, 199 AD2d 550, (2nd
Dept. 1993), aff’d 84 NY2d 992 (1994) . Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1987)
90 Bernhard, supra note 3, at 110-111.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to 4C-6 (West 2001).
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can do. This is an ideal way to get your students involved in doing justice,
learning about the criminal justice system, and also learning that they, even
while they’re in law school, can do something to make that system better.

FOR

UNJUST CONVICTION

STATUTE

AL Act # 2001
659

Cal Penal Code
§§ 4900 to 4906

HB# 5933

STATE

AL

CA

CT

Preponderance of the
evidence.

Not specified

Claims Commissioner

State Board of Control makes a recommendation to the
legislature

State Division of
Risk Management
and the Committee
on Compensation for
Wrongful Incarceration

WHO DECIDES

2 years from date of
pardon or dismissal

6 months after
acquittal, pardon, or
release and 4 months
before new legislative meeting

2 years after exoneration or dismissal

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

No limit. Commissioner may consider
wide range of damages and expenses,
including attorney’s
fees. This claim not
a bar to other claims
& Commissioner
may order payment
for job training as
well as for counseling and tuition at
state school.

$100 per day of
Incarceration.

Minimum of $50,000
for each year of
incarceration, but
legislature must
appropriate the
funds.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

WHEN

2008

Amended
8/28/00

2004

PASSED

CONTRIBUTORY

Nothing specified.

Claimant must show
he did not contribute
to arrest or conviction.

Nothing specified,
but a new felony
conviction will end a
claimant’s right to
compensation.

unknown

Pardon, or conviction vacated, or
reversed, and the
charges dismissed on
grounds consistent
with innocence.

Pardon for innocence
or being “innocent”

Not specified

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

Conviction vacated
or reversed and the
charges dismissed on
grounds consistent
with innocence

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT

2009]

The following table summarizes the statutes on indemnification for unjust conviction and imprisonment that Adele Bernhard discusses in her article When Justice Fails, 6
U Chi L Sch Roundtable 73. (Last updated August 11, 2008.)
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TABLE
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STATUTE

DC Code § 11221 to 1-1225

2008 FL. ALS
39

Ill Rev Stat ch.
705 § 505/8

STATE

DC

FL

IL

Preponderance of the
evidence

Court of Claims

Trial court – can
consider claim even
if prosecuting
authority does not
certify innocence.
Claim would then be
sent to admins. law
judge for factual
determination of
innocence, and trial
judge could adapt
findings or not.

Initially, petitioner
must file for a declaration of wrongful
conviction. After
July, 2008, petitioner
must file w/in 90
days after order
vacating conviction.
Prior to July 08, by
July 1, 2010. Then
must file for compensation w/in 2
years from declaration.

Available to any person released after
1979.

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

WHEN

2008

1945

≤5 yrs., 15K max,
≤14 yrs., 30K max,
>14 yrs., 35K max,
with COLA increase
for each year since
1945.

1981

PASSED

$50,000 per year,
adjusted for COL
increases. & 120
hours of tuition at a
career center, community college or
state university; and
any fines or costs
imposed at sentence.
Limit of $2 million.

No maximum & No
punitive damages

MAXIMUM AWARDS

Must not have been
convicted of a felony; and must not
have been serving
time for another felony when serving
time for the felony
for which petitioner
was declared innocent.

Claimant must show
that he did not commit any of the acts
charged, or that his
acts constituted no
crime and that he
did not, by his misconduct, bring about
the prosecution, and
he must not have
plead guilty.

CONTRIBUTORY

unknown

Pardon for Innocence.

If prosecuting authority
does not certify, admin.
law judge
must find
innocence by
clear and
convincing.

Civil Court

WHO DECIDES

418

Certification by
prosecuting authority
that petitioner is
innocent, that no further criminal proceeding will be
initiated, no questions of fact remain,
and petitioner is eligible for compensation.

Clear &
Convincing

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

Pardon for innocence
or conviction
reversed or set aside
on the ground that
claimant is not
guilty.

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT
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STATUTE

Iowa Code Ann
§ 663A.1

R.S.15:572.8
and .9 & Code
Civ. Pro. Art.
87

Ann L. MA.
Gen’l Laws,
Chapter 258D
§ 1-9

STATE

IA

LA

MA

Clear &
Convincing

Superior Court in the
county where the
claimant was convicted or in Suffolk
County.

19th Judicial District
Court - trial by
judge alone.

2 years

2 years from vacatur
of conviction or for
cases pending when
statue was passed,
by September 2007.

2 years

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

A maximum of
$500,000 may be
awarded and the
Court may order services – physical &/
or emotional, educational services at any
state of community
college, and
expungement of the
record of conviction.

$15,000 per year;
with a maximum
award of $150,000.
Court may award
costs of job/skills
training for one year,
and medically necessary medical and
counseling services
for three year; as
well as tuition
expenses at a community college or
unit of the state university system –at a
cost of not more
than $40,000.

$50 per day & lost
wages up to
$25,000/yr & attorney’s fees.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

WHEN

2004

2005

1997

PASSED

CONTRIBUTORY

Claimant cannot
have plead guilty,
unless such plea was
withdrawn, vacated
or nullified by operation of law.

Nothing specified.

Claimant must not
have plead guilty.

unknown

Pardon or conviction
reversed & charges
dismissed on
grounds consistent
with innocence or
case tried to acquittal.

Clear and
Convincing

District Court for
liability; State
Appeal Board or
Civil Ct. for Damages.

WHO DECIDES

2009]

Conviction reversed
or vacated, and petitioner “has proven”
factual innocence.

Clear &
Convincing

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

Conviction vacated
or reversed &
charges dismissed.

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT
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STATUTE

14 Me Rev Stat
Ann 8241-8244
Md State Fin &
Proc § 10-501
MO Statute
650.055 – 9

Mont. Code
Ann. § 53-1214

NH Stat § 541B:14

NJ Stat Ann
§§ 52:4C-1 to
4C-6

STATE

ME

MD

MO

MT

NH

NJ

Clear &
Convincing

Board must
find by
majority vote
that claim is
“justified.”
Superior Court

Board of Claims

Funds to be appropriated by the legislature

Not specified

Board of Public
Works

2 years from release
or pardon

3 years

Nothing specified.

1 year form release
from confinement –
after August 28,
2003.

Not specified

2 years from pardon.

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

Twice the amount of
claimant’s income in
the year prior to
incarceration or 20K
per year of incarceration, whichever is
greater.

20K cap

Provides educational
aid to wrongfully
convicted persons
exonerated by postconviction DNA
testing.

$50 per day of postconviction confinement.

Actual damages.

300K, no punitive
damages.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

WHEN

1997

1977

2003

2005

1963

1993

PASSED

CONTRIBUTORY

Claimant did not, by
his own conduct,
cause or bring about
conviction.

Nothing specified.

Nothing specified.

Nothing specified.

Nothing specified.

Nothing specified.

unknown

None

“Found innocent”

DNA evidence must
demonstrate
innocence

“Conclusive”

Superior Court

WHO DECIDES

420

Person must be
“determined to be
‘actually innocent’
only by DNA Evidence.’

Pardon on the
ground that conviction was in error.

Clear &
Convincing

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

Pardon for Innocence.

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT
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STATUTE

NY Ct. of
Claims Act § 8b

NC Gen Stat
§§ 148-82 to
148-84

Ohio Rev Code
Ann § 2305.02
& § 2743.48

51 Okl. St.
§ 154

STATE

NY

NC

OH

OK

Clear and
convincing
evidence

Preponderance of evidence;
Walden v.
State, 547
N.E.2d 962
State Civil Court

Court of Common
Pleas for liability;
Court of Claims for
damages.

Industrial Commission makes a recommendation to
Governor.

No time limit

2 years

5 years

2 years Cases where
claimant asserts
proof with DNA evidence shall receive
docketing priority.

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

$175,000 (no punitive damages).

40,330 per year, (or
amt. determined by
state auditor) in
addition to lost
wages, costs, and
attorney’s fees.

50,000 each year
Max. of 750,000
Award may also
include job skills
training and tuition
reimbursement.

No limit.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

WHEN

2004

1986
Amended
2002

1947
Amended
2008

1984

PASSED

Claimant must not
have pled guilty, and
must have been
imprisoned solely as
a result of the
wrongful conviction.

Claimant must not
have pled guilty.

Nothing specified.

Claimant did not
commit any of the
acts charged in the
accusatory instrument, or his acts did
not constitute a
crime; and claimant
did not by his own
conduct cause or
bring about the conviction.

CONTRIBUTORY

unknown

Conviction vacated
and charges dismissed, or pardoned,
and, in either case,
upon a finding that
the claimant did not
commit the crime for
which he or she had
been convicted.

Conviction vacated
or reversed &
charges dismissed,

Not specified

Court of Claims

WHO DECIDES

2009]

Pardon for innocence

Clear &
Convincing

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

Pardon or conviction
reversed & charges
dismissed on
grounds consistent
with innocence or
case tried to acquittal.

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT

\\server05\productn\B\BPI\18-2\BPI207.txt
Seq: 19
9-JUN-09

WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T AND WHY

12:30

421

STATUTE

Tenn Code Ann
§9-8-108
Tex Code Ann
§§ 103.001;
103.051; 052,
103.1041.

78-35a-405

STATE

TN

TX

UT

Finding of
Innocence
must be by
clear and
convincing but no separate standard
for determining award.

Preponderance of evidence.

District court where
conviction was rendered.

May file administrative claim with
comptroller or civil
suit but not both.

Board of Claims

WHO DECIDES

Petitioner must file
for post-conviction
relief (e.g. declaration of innocence)
w/in 1 year of final
judgment, or date on
which petitioner
should have known
of new facts upon
which petition is
based - no separate
limit for filing claim
for compensation.

2 years release from
custody or discovery
of evidence substantiating claim.

1 year

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

For 15 years, petitioner may receive
the monetary value
of average annual
nonagricultural payroll. Office of Crime
Victim’ Reparation
to make initial payment w/in 45 days
of court finding of
innocence. The
award is not taxable
under Utah law.

50K per year to a
max of $500,000.
$100K per year if
sentenced to death –
and child support
payments that
accrued and were
not paid while
claimant was in
prison.

$1,000,000.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

WHEN

2008

Amended
2001 &
2007

1984
Amended
2004

PASSED

Claimant must be a
citizen or otherwise
lawfully in the USA
at the time of the
incident. Petitioner
can not recover for
any period of time
while serving a sentence for another felony, and payments
may be suspended if
petitioner is convicted of a subsequent felony.

Claimant must not
have pled guilty.
Payments terminate
if claimant is subsequently convicted of
a crime punishable
as a felony.

Nothing specified.

CONTRIBUTORY

422

Under Utah 78-35a402, district court
must determine factual innocence.

Pardon or has been
granted relief on the
basis of innocence.

Not specified

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

“Exoneration” or
pardon for innocence

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT
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STATUTE

8.01-195.10

STATE

VA

Not Specified

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

Conviction vacated
pursuant to VA
Code Cptr. 19.2327.2 et seq.

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT

General Assembly

WHO DECIDES

Not Specified

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

90% of the VA per
capita personal
income–for up to 20
yrs. Tuition worth
$10,00 in the VA
Comm. College system.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

WHEN

2004

PASSED

CONTRIBUTORY

Claimant may not
have pled guilty –
unless he or she was
charged with a capital offense. If the
claimant should subsequently be convicted of a felony,
he or she becomes
ineligible to receive
further payments
owed. Finally,
acceptance of the
award precludes filing any further or
additional claims
against the state for
conduct arising out
of the factual situation in connection
with the conviction.
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STATUTE

13 V.S.A Chptr.
182

28 USC § 1495
& § 2513

W Va Code
§ 14-2-13(a)

STATE

VT

US
(Fed)

WV

2 years after pardon
or dismissal

“fair and reasonable
damages.”

WHEN

1987

1948

2007

PASSED

CONTRIBUTORY

Claimant did not
contribute to or
bring about conviction.

Claimant did not
commit acts charged
and did not by misconduct or neglect
cause prosecution.

The claimant did not
suborn perjury or
fabricate evidence
during any of the
proceedings related
to the crime with
which he or she was
charged.

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL

Court of Claims

5K

Minimum of 30K
per year - maximum
of 60K per year of
incarceration,
adjusted proportionally for partial years
served; Awards may
include in addition:
lost wages, costs,
and attorneys fees;
Claimant entitled to
up to 10 years of
eligibility for Vermont State Health
Plan; Award is not
taxable by state and
no offset for cost of
incarceration is
allowed.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

Seq: 22

Clear &
Convincing

U.S. Court of Federal Claims

3 years from exoneration, unless claimant was not provided
with notice of the
right to bring an
action, in which case
claimant shall be
granted an additional
year in which to file

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

unknown

Pardon for innocence, or conviction
reversed & either
charges dismissed or
acquittal on retrial.

Not specified

Washington County
Supreme Court

WHO DECIDES

424

Pardon for innocence, or conviction
reversed or set aside
on ground that
claimant is not guilty
and found not guilty
at new trial or
rehearing.

Preponderance of evidence

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

As a result of DNA
evidence, the conviction was reversed or
vacated and the
charges dismissed, or
tried to an acquittal,
or a pardon was
granted.

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT
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STATUTE

Wis Stat
§ 775.05

STATE

WI

Clear &
Convincing

OF PROOF

UNJUST CONVICTION)

None specified
besides proof of
innocence.

STANDARD

IMPRISONMENT FOR

(BESIDES

CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT

Claims Board

WHO DECIDES

None specified

FILING

TIME LIMITS FOR

5K/yr, max 25K but
Board may petition
legislature for additional funds.

MAXIMUM AWARDS

WHEN

1913

PASSED

CONTRIBUTORY

Claimant did not
contribute to or
bring about conviction.
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